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SOVIET INHERITANCE CASES IN
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Many American states have statutes limiting transmission of
monies from estates in this country to citizens of countries behind
the "Iron Curtain." American courts have come under heavy
criticism for construing these statutes unfavorably to foreign
heirs, especially where transmission to heirs in the Soviet Union
is withheld. This article analyzes the relevant American and
Soviet law and concludes that American courts, while they have
not always been completely objective, nevertheless may be justified
in withholding distribution from Soviet citizens.
INTRODUCTION
All the known facts of a Sovietized state lead to the irresistible
conclusion that sending American money to a person within the
borders of an Iron Curtain country is like sending a basket of
food to Little Red Ridinghood in care of her "grandmother."1
A NUMBER of American courts, using language similar to that
used by Justice Musmanno in the passage quoted above, have
refused to permit distribution of funds from American estates to
beneficiaries living within the confines of the Soviet bloc, par-
ticularly to those living in the Soviet Union itself.2 Such decisions
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INTERNATIONAL LAW (Law in Eastern Europe No. 10, 1965), THE SOCIALIST COMTMON-
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1964); Sovir LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1962); co-author (with Vladimir
Gsovski), GOVERNMENT, LAW AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
(1959).
'Belemecich Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 511, 192 A.2d 740, 742 (1963), rev'd per curiam
sub nom. Consul Gen. of Yugoslavia v. Pennsylvania, 375 U.S. 395 (1964).
2 See cases cited in Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites
to Share in Estates of American Decedents, 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 297 (1952); Heyman,
The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession Under the "Iron Curtain Rule," 52 Nw.
U.L. REV. 221 (1957); Jones, Iron Curtain Distributees: A Mounting Problem in Penn-
sylvania's Orphans' Courts, 69 Dica. L. REv. 227 (1965); Scheller & Mayda, Payment
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have become a focal point for recent criticism by American com-
mentators, most notably Professor Berman3 of the Harvard Law
School and Professor Ginsburgs4 of the University of Iowa.
Both Professors Berman and Ginsburgs reach the fundamental
conclusion that American courts have exemplified political bias and
motivation when dealing with claims of the nationals of a socialist
country to an American estate. Professor Ginsburgs arrives at this
position after a detailed examination of Soviet civil law, which, he
finds, displays a radical evolution from drastic restrictions tanta-
mount to the elimination of the institution of inheritance to a
modern-day progression towards liberalization. 5 Finding that Soviet
law does indeed provide for inheritance by foreigners from Soviet resi-
dents, both in theory and in unreported practice,6 he proceeds to ex-
amine the well-known California decision of Estate of Gogabashvele,7
in which a California appellate court refused to allow a Soviet heir
to receive his share of an estate because the necessary reciprocity
required by the California statute8 was absent. Professor Ginsburgs
concludes that the Gogabashvele decision (and impliedly all others
similar to it) is
the most refined amalgam of obvious half-truths, sly innuendoes,
crude fabrications, and gross distortions that dedicated narrow-
mindedness and political bias have combined to produce on this
theme. With all the good will, charity, and kindness in the world,
one can describe it only as an unholy brew which patent intel-
lectual dishonesty alone could manage to distill.9
Professor Berman, on the other hand, relies primarily on his own
experience in American courts and his conversations with Soviet
lawyers and government officials.10 He cites, for example, the ex-
istence of unreported decisions and secret decrees which he has
been shown while in the Soviet Union." He concludes that "for
of Estate Shares to Beneficiaries Behind the "Iron Curtain," Wis. Bar Bull., June 1955,
p. 17; 7 W. Ras. L. REv. 179 (1956).
8 Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 257 (1962).
'Ginsburgs, Inheritance by Foreigners Under Soviet Law, 51 IowA L. Rav. 16
(1965).
5 Ginsburgs, supra note 4, at 24-34.
Old. at 50-59.
195 Cal. App. 2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 259.
o Ginsburgs, supra note 4, at 70.
10 Berman, supra note 3, at 269 & n.36.
12 Ibid.
Vol. 1966: 98]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1966: 98
American judicial decisions to withhold distribution of funds in
estates to Soviet heirs constitutes a 'discriminatory practice' against
Soviet citizens that 'sometimes takes the form of a manifestation of
cold war.' -12 While recognizing mitigating factors13 he finds that
the hatefulness of a foreign country's social, economic, and political
system is no justification for depriving its citizens of their right
to receive their distributive shares of American estates, or for de-
priving American citizens of their right to leave their property to
whomever they wish. 14
In conclusion, he says that state statutes
should not be converted into absolute barriers either by imposing
upon the foreign claimant an insuperable burden of proof or by
insisting that the legal system under which he lives conform to our
own ideals.15
I
AMERICAN STATUTES
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to review briefly the
system of inheritance of American estates by heirs residing in com-
munist countries. In many states the foreign heir of an American
estate has the same rights of inheritance as a United States citizen.1
A number of states, however, have sought to limit severely this right
by statutes which may prevent the transmission of American estates
to residents of communist countries.
A. The Two Basic Types
There are actually two types of statutes. The New York17 or
"benefit" type'8 provides that where the beneficiary of an American
'2 Id. at 272.
"Id. at 272-73.
'
4 Id. at 274.
"Ibid.
116 E.g., TEx. PROB. CODE § 41 (1956).
1. N.Y. SuRR. Cr. ACr § 269-a.
ZR Aside from New York, "benefit" statutes are in force in seven other states: FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 731.28 (2) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 161 (a) (Supp. 1964); MAss.
ANN. LA-WS ch. 206, § 27A (Supp. 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:25-10 (1953); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 111.070 (1) (q) (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1156 (Supp. 1965); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-13-13 (1956). According to Chaitkin, supra note 2, at 314-15,
Michigan, Missouri and Vermont have also adopted the "benefit" theory by local
court rules. Maine apparently has adopted the "benefit" test by judicial decision.
Berman v. Frendel, 154 Me. 337, 148 A.2d 93 (1959). Illinois and Tennessee, on the
other hand, have refused to adopt the benefit test by judicial decision. In the Matter of
Estate of Miller, 35 Ill. App. 2d 349, 182 N.E.2d 913 (1962); Hamilton Natl Bank v.
Touriansky, 197 Tenn. 245, 271 S.W.2d 1 (1954).
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estate would not have the "benefit" or "use" or "control" of the
funds in question, the court should hold them in trust until such
time as the beneficiaries will be able to use them. 9 The second
type of provision which has been adopted is the "reciprocity"
statute.2 0 Under this test the right of the communist alien to inherit
is dependent upon the reciprocal right of a United States citizen
to inherit from a decedent in that alien's country on equal terms
with resident citizens. The burden of proving such a reciprocal
right is upon the claimant legatee, and proof of the foreign law is a
matter of fact.2 ' If the claimant fails in his burden and no other
heirs are found, the estate escheats to the state.
22
Several distinctions between the two types of statutes must be
made. First, the benefit type does not deprive the alien of his right
to inherit. Legally he does inherit the estate, but payment is with-
held until he receives the "benefit, use and control" of the funds.
The reciprocity statute, however, gives the alien no inheritance
rights; rather, the estate immediately escheats. The practical results
of both types are the same under present circumstances, but those
whose legacies are withheld under the benefit rule conceivably
still could take their estates in the foreseeable future. Second, the
focus of inquiry into foreign law is different under each statute.
The reciprocity statute requires analysis of the foreign law to
determine whether a United States citizen can inherit under that
law. The benefit rule, on the other hand, logically requires an
analysis of the inheritance rights of the citizens of the foreign
country in question. If under the law of the foreign country,
citizens and aliens have the same inheritance rights, the identical
result ensues whether one applies the reciprocity or benefit rule.
Courts have sometimes confused the tests, 23 however, and under
20 In addition, the statutes of ten states provide that the money will revert to the
state after a specified period of time, subject to the right of the beneficiary to reclaim
the funds later, without interest. E.g., N.Y. SuR. CT. Aar § 269-a.
20 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 259, 259.2, CAL. PROB. CODE § 259.1 (Supp. 1965); IowA
CODE ANN. § 567.8 (Supp. 1964); MONT. .Ev. CODEs ANN. § 91-520 (1964); NEv. REv. STAT.
§§ 134.230-.250 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-3 to -5 (1965); ORE. REv. STAT. §
111.070(1) (a) (Supp. 1957).
21 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259.1 (Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.8.2 (Supp.
1964); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 91-520.2 (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 134.240 (1957);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-4 (1965); ORE. RV. STAT. § 111.070(2) (Supp. 1957).
22 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259.2; IoWA CODE ANN. § 567.8.3 (Supp. 1964); NEV. Rlv.
STAT. § 134.250 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-5 (1965); ORE. REv. STAT. § 111.070(3)
(Supp. 1957).
23 E.g., Estate of Nersisian, 155 Cal. App. 2d 561, 318 P.2d 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957),
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the benefit rule have focused not on the foreign law but upon other
factors, such as difficulties and costs of transmission, and monetary
regulations.24
B. The History Behind the Statutes and Their
Judicial Interpretation
In this country, because of the large immigrant population and
resultant family ties with "the old country," questions of inheritance
have been of greater importance than elsewhere. These questions
usually arise in connection with inheritance of American estates
by aliens residing abroad. Initially, the problem was raised in con-
nection with the discriminatory Nazi legislation, the first statutes
appearing shortly after the 1938 Munich Agreement. 2 Although
primarily designed to prevent Germany from obtaining control of
American assets, numerous cases before World War II applied this
restrictive legislation to cases of inheritance devolving on Soviet
citizens.26  The opposition of American courts to allowing the
Soviet government to share in American estates disappeared with
the Soviet embroilment in the war on the side of the Western
powers. In the case of In re A lexandro f's Estate,27 for example, the
in which the lower court seemed to apply a benefit test although the California statute,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 259, is clearly of the reciprocity type. This led to confusion in lower
California courts. E.g., Estate of Anna Smith, No. 124249, Super. Ct., 1960, cited in
Estate of Feierman, 202 Cal. App. 2d 552, 555 & n.1, 20 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885 & n.1 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
21 Most frequently courts have withheld distribution by relying on a Treasury
Regulation, 31 C.F.R. § 211.2 (a) (1965), discussed infra notes 30-32 and accompanying
text. A second device relied upon is the foreign currency exchange rate. Courts have
held that the rate of exchange of dollars for the local currency of a communist coun-
try is so distorted that the beneficiary receives only a fractional share of the real
value, the remainder being "confiscated" by the state through the currency exchange
medium. See Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 38-39, 116 N.E.2d 854, 858 (1954); In the
Matter of Dobo, 204 Misc. 975, 980-83, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441, 447-49 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
Berman criticizes these cases for using "false criteria" in measuring the exchange
value of the dollar in terms of the foreign currency. Berman, supra note 3, at 266-68
& n.32.
'5 See Chaitkin, supra note 2, at 298-302.
20 E.g., In the Matter of the Estate of Bold, 173 Misc. 545, 18 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Surr. Ct.
1940).
2 61 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Surr. Ct. 1945). A similar view was expressed by the California
court of appeals in Estate of Kennedy, 106 Cal. App. 2d 621, 235 P.2d 837 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951). The court established that Rumania, under Russian domination and with
a communist government, had nationalized various kinds of industry and property.
It did not believe, however, that these facts were relevant to the issue, because the law
of wills, descent, and succession was not affected by the political and economic changes
in Rumania, and property other than nationalized property was inheritable.
Both courts overlooked the fact that, although the circle of persons admitted
[Vol. 1966: 98
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court found that Soviet inheritance law had been amended so that
all reasons for withholding distribution of American estates to
Soviet nationals had been removed. With the advent of the cold war,
however, American courts soon resumed their original course.2 8 When
the Soviet form of government spread to other countries, nationals
of those countries were accorded treatment similar to that given
to Soviet citizens.29
On February 9, 1951, the Treasury Department, in concurrence
with the State Department, suspended transactions involving the
payment of monies to nationals of the Soviet Union and her satel-
lites. Although this directive applied only to checks and warrants
drawn against funds of the United States, American courts have
often found guidance in its provisions for inheritance cases pending
before them. Section 211.3 of the regulation suspending payments
specifically named Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, the
Russian Zone of Occupation of Germany, and the Russian Sector
of Berlin,30 and American courts have thus denied relief to resi-
dents of those areas.31 When other countries were added to the
to privileged inheritance was enlarged by the 1945 Edict of the Federal Presidium of
the Soviet Union, that edict still did not remove the limitations to own and therefore
bequeath property. See 1 GsovsKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAv 555-80, 657-58 (1948).
28 E.g., In the Matter of Best, 200 Misc. 332, 107 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sun.. Ct. 1951);
Sobko Estate, 88 Pa. D. 8= C. 76 (Orphans' Ct. 1954).
20 E.g., Estate of Arbulich, 248 P.2d 179 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), aft'd, 41 Cal. 2d
86, 257 P.2d 433, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953) (Yugoslavia); Mazurowski, 331 Mass.
33, 116 N.E.2d 854 (1954) (Poland); In the Matter of Estate of Url, 7 N.J. Super. 455,
71 A.2d 665 (Somerset County Ct.), appeal dismissed, 5 N.J. 507, 76 A.2d 249 (1950)
(Hungary); In the Matter of Dobo, 204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Surr. Ct. 1953)
(Czechoslovakia and Hungary); In re Miller's Will, 115 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Sunr. Ct. 1952)
(East Germany); In the Matter of Geffen, 199 Misc. 756, 104 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Surr. Ct.
1951) (Lithuania).
30 16 Fed. Reg. 1818 (1951), as amended, 31 C.F.R. § 211.2 (a) (1965). The regulation
now includes Communist China, Cuba, North Korea and North Viet Nam. Poland
was omitted from the .1957 list, 22 Fed. Reg. 4134 (1957), Rumania from the 1960 list,
25 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1960), and Bulgaria from the 1964 list, 29 Fed. Reg. 15287 (1964).
The current regulation thus reads: "It is hereby determined that postal, transporta-
tion, or banking facilities in general or local conditions in Albania, Communist-
controlled China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North
Korea, North Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Russian Zone
of Occupation of Germany, and the Russian Sector of Occupation of Berlin, Germany,
are such that there is not a reasonable assurance that a payee in those areas will
actually receive checks or warrants drawn against funds of the United States, or
agencies or instrumentalities thereof, and be able to negotiate the same for full value."
31 C.F.R. § 211.2 (a) (1965).
3"E.g., Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 116 N.E.2d 854 (1954) (Poland); In the Matter
of Dobo, 204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Suit. Ct. 1953) (Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary); In re Rysiakiewicz' Will, 114 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Suit. Ct. 1952) (Poland); In the
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list, the same judicial result ensued.3 2
These state court decisions have, on the one hand, often em-
ployed a close analysis of the law of the communist country in
question, but have also led to some rather remarkably less than
desirable judicial opinions. Justice Musmanno's comment which
prefaced this article is but one example. Professor Berman has
noted several other instances of judicial prejudging through the
use of political bias.33
It must also be noted, however, that decisions under these
statutes have demonstrated a liberal evolution with respect to the
communist nations other than the Soviet Union. For example, the
Montana courts have now found the requisite reciprocity with
Rumania,34 Czechoslovakia,35 and Yugoslavia.30 Oregon has found
reciprocity with Estonia by virtue of a treaty.37 Pennsylvania has
found the requisite "benefit, use and control" for Polish38 and Yugo-
slav3 9 heirs. The existence of reciprocity with Yugoslavia has been
firmly established by the Supreme Court in Kolovrat v. Oregon,40
in which the Oregon Supreme Court's failure to find reciprocity was
reversed on the basis of an 1881 treaty between the United States
and Serbia.41 While there are decisions withholding distribution
Matter of Terry, 200 Misc. 543, 107 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sur. Ct. 1951) (Hungary); In the
Matter of Best, 200 Misc. 332, 107 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Surf. Ct. 1951) (Russia); In the
Matter of Geffen, 199 Misc. 756, 104 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Surf. Ct. 1951) (Lithuania); State
Land Board v. Pekarek, 234 Ore. 74, 378 P.2d 734 (1963) (Czechoslovakia); Liebelt
Estate, 13 Fiduc. Rep. 63 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1963) (East Germany); Choma Estate,
30 Pa. D. & C.2d 157 (Orphans' Ct. 1963) (Russia).
32 E.g., In the Matter of Mulligan, 200 Misc. 499, 107 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sur. Ct. 1951)
(Communist China).
33 Berman, supra note 3, at 257-58 & n.3.
34 In the Matter of Estate of Gaspar, 128 Mont. 383, 275 P.2d 656 (1954).
" In the Matter of Estate of Hosova, 143 Mont. 74, 387 P.2d 305 (1963).
"'In the Matter of Estate of Spehar, 140 Mont. 76, 367 P.2d 563 (1961); In the
Matter of Estate of Ginn, 136 Mont. 338, 347 P.2d 467 (1959); In the Matter of
Estate of Spoya, 129 Mont. 83, 282 P.2d 452 (1955).
37 In the Matter of Estate of Kasendorf, 222 Ore. 463, 480-81, 353 P.2d 531, 539
(1960).
3"Poplawski Estate, 10 Fiduc. Rep. 503 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1960); accord, In the
Matter of Estate of Tybus, 28 Misc. 2d 278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
" Aras Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (Orphans' Ct. 1959).
10 366 U.S. 187 (1961), reversing In the Matter of Estate of Stoich, 220 Ore. 448,
349 P.2d 255 (1960). See also Consul Gen. of Yugoslavia v. Pennsylvania, 375 U.S.
395, reversing per curiam Belemecich Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1964).
" Treaty With Serbia for Facilitating and Developing Commercial Relations, Oct.
2/14, 1881, art. II, para. 2, 22 Stat. 963, T.S. No. 319 (effective Dec. 27, 1882) [now in
effect with Yugoslavia via Agreement With Yugoslavia Regarding Pecuniary Claims
of the United States and Its Nationals, July 19, 1948, art. V, 62 Stat. 2658, T.I.A.S.
No. 1803].
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to these communist nations, 42 the picture is rapidly changing.
Neither Professors Berman nor Ginsburgs takes full cognizance of
this evolution, although in all fairness it must be said that they
are both primarily concerned with the law in the Soviet Union itself
and the cases involving Soviet heirs as distinguished from heirs in
other communist nations.
II
SOVIET STATUTES
Since Soviet inheritance law is important to the court's inquiry
under either type of statute, it is worthwhile at this point to examine
the relevant Soviet provisions.
Where an American benefit statute is involved, it is important
to note that the institution of inheritance was ostensibly abolished
in the Soviet Union only during a short period after the Revo-
lution.43 It was gradually reestablished, and since 1945 has been
a part of the Soviet legal system in a form greatly resembling the
provisions of the leading civil codes of Europe.44
American reciprocity statutes are phrased in terms of requiring
equality of treatment of American beneficiaries with Soviet bene-
ficiaries. The evidence which an American court seeks, therefore,
is evidence of discrimination or nondiscrimination against aliens
in inheritance proceedings in the foreign country. Inequality of
treatment between Russian and American beneficiaries could exist
in a variety of factual contexts. The two most important situations
would be: 1) where the decedent is a Russian citizen, and 2) where
the decedent is an alien in the Soviet Union.45 Whether there is
1-E.g., Estate of Karban, 118 Cal. App. 2d 240, 257 P.2d 649 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953)
(Czechoslovakia); Estate of Arbulich, 248 P.2d 179 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), afJ'd,
41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953) (Yugoslavia); In the
Matter of Estate of Draganoff, 43 Misc. 2d 233, 252 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sur. Ct. 1964)
(Bulgaria); In the Matter of Estate of Reidl, 39 Misc. 2d 805, 242 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Surr.
Ct. 1963) (Czechoslovakia); State Land Board v. Pekarek, 234 Ore. 74, 378 P.2d 734
(1963) (Czechoslovakia); Liebelt Estate, 13 Fiduc. Rep. 63 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1963)
(East Germany).
"See 1 GsovsKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAw 623-27 (1948).
"See 2 GsovsK & GRzyBoWsK, GOVERNMENT, LAW AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
AND EAS'ERN EURoPE_ 1163-74 (1959).
"r There are actually six variable factors in each case: 1) residence of decedent, 2)
nationality of decedent, 3) place of death of decedent, 4) residence of beneficiary, 5)
nationality of beneficiary, and 6) location of property. American reciprocity statutes
are principally concerned with the rights of resident citizens of the United States, and
hence factors 4 and 5 will be constant. The property in question must be located in the
Soviet Union for courts there to have jurisdiction, and hence factor 6 will also be
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discrimination in either situation is a matter not free from doubt.
In the case of the decedent who is an alien in the Soviet Union,
no answer could safely be given prior to 1961. No Soviet statute
alluded to the problem, and there were no cases involving such a
factual setting.46 It was clear, however, that the Soviet position
was to apply Soviet law to all inheritance cases, even if involving
foreign nationals.47 This result was achieved by utilizing the na-
tional regime doctrine, under which all aspects of the personal
status of a resident alien automatically fell under the law of the
forum.48
The Principles of Civil Legislation of 1961 have shed new light
on this problem. Article 122 states that "foreign citizens enjoy
in the USSR the same civil law capacity as Soviet citizens," '4 and
article 59 provides that "foreign citizens have access to Soviet
courts and enjoy equal procedural rights with Soviet citizens."' 0
Thus the rights and obligations of aliens in the Soviet Union have
been made commensurate with those of Soviet citizens. In addition,
constant. For purposes of discussion in this article, it will be assumed that factor 3
(place of death) is irrelevant.
The remaining possibilities thus consist of a decedent, leaving property in the
Soviet Union to an American resident citizen, who is: a) an American citizen residing
in Russia, b) an American citizen residing in the United States, c) a Russian citizen
residing in Russia, and d) a Russian citizen residing in the United States.
As will be pointed out later in the text, Soviet law today would make no sub.
stantive distinction between cases c and d. This accounts for the singularity of the
situation numbered "I" in the text. Case a is the text's situation number "2." Case b
properly should constitute a situation number "3" in the text, but since such a situa-
tion will be comparatively rare, since it might involve other considerations of inter-
national law, and since it might be resolved in the same manner as situation "2," it
has been omitted.
'6 See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
7 This position was amplified by the provisions of § 17 of the Foreign Citizens
Regulation of August 4, 1922, of the Belorussian government, which put the estates
of foreign nationals under the rule of Soviet law. See Uschakow, Die Entwicklung des
internationalen Privatrechts und des Aussenhandelsrechts in der Sowjetunion seit
Stalins Tod (The Development of International Private Law and Foreign Commerce
Law in the Soviet Union Since the Death of Stalin), IV/2 JAHRBUCHFOR OSrhECHT
(Yearbook for Eastern Law) 64 (1963).
Is When Soviet citizens died abroad, Soviet jurists contended that this doctrine
restricted jurisdiction of the country of residence in matters of inheritance. They
claimed that the legal capacity of Soviet citizens abroad was governed by foreign
law but that inheritance was still determined by Soviet law. See PERaEMKI & KaYLOV,
MEZHDUNARODNOE CHASTNOE PRAVO (International Private Law) §§ 54-55 (2d ed. 1959).
Soviet jurists apparently argued this point in order to justify the claim that the
Soviet state is entitled to inherit estates of Soviet citizens who die abroad leaving no
heirs. Id. § 55, at 184.
49 Principles of Civil Legislation art. 122, [1961] Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta
SSSR (Journal of the USSR Supreme Soviet) No. 525 [hereinafter cited as Ved. SSSR].
50 Principles of Civil Legislation art. 59, [1961] Ved. SSSR No. 525.
[Vol. 1966: 98
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article 127 abandons the national regime doctrine in inheritance
cases: "Matters of succession are governed by the law of the country
in which the deceased had his last permanent residence.".51 Taken
together, these provisions seem clearly to indicate a shift in position
in Soviet law, establishing definite choice of law rules which recog-
nize the possible application in Soviet courts of foreign law, and
treating alien beneficiaries in the Soviet Union on a parity with
Soviet beneficiaries. This shift in position would seem to apply
equally to alien beneficiaries outside the Soviet Union. The only
possible limitation in this latter situation is the technical one of
transmission of sums realized from the liquidation of Soviet estates
to persons living abroad. Here a resolution of the Council of
Ministers of April 21, 1955, comes into play.52 This resolution
provides an exception to the general provisions of currency controls
in the Soviet Union. All that is required for transmission is a
certificate of the notary who conducts the probate proceedings
stating that the nonresident beneficiary is entitled to a share of the
estate.53
The Principles of Civil Legislation do not expressly answer the
question presented by the case of the Soviet citizen who dies and
leaves property to a resident of the United States. Here again
there is no statute on the topic, and the few cases referred to by
Soviet jurists54 do not involve decedents of central Russia itself,
51 Principles of Civil Legislation art. 127, [1961] Ved. SSSR No. 525.
52 [1959] Sbornik Prikazov i instruktsii po finansovo-khoziaistvennym voprosam
(Collection of Decrees, Orders and Instructions on Financial-Economic Questions)
No. 11, p. 85.
" No permit of the Minister of Finance is required.
Transmission also depends on reciprocity, which, however, is considered con-
clusively proven when the Soviet Union has a treaty with the beneficiary's country.
See 2 LUNTS, MEZHDUNARODNOE CHASTNOE PRAVO (International Private Law) 279-80
(1959); Volchkov & Rubanov, Ogorvorka o vzaimnosti v sovetsko-amerikanskikh
nasledstvennykh otnosheniiakh (The Reciprocity Requirement in Soviet-American
Inheritance Relations), [1960] SOvETSK EZHEGODNIK MEZHDUNARODNOCO PRAVA (Soviet
Yearbook of International Law) 308. Such treaties are uncommon with Western
nations. One example is an exchange of notes between the Soviet and Greek govern-
ments in 1956. 17-18 Sbornik Deistvuiushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashchenii i Konventsii,
Zakliuchennykh SSSR s Inostrannymi Gosudarstvami (Collection of Treaties, Agree-
ments and Conventions in Force Concluded by the USSR with Foreign Countries)
270-71 [hereinafter cited as S.D.D. USSR].
54 Boguslavskii & Rubanov, Crazhdansko-protsessual'nye prava inostrantsev v
SSSR (Rights of Aliens in Civil Process in the USSR), [1959] SOVETSKu EZHErODN1K
MZU-DUNARODNOGO PRAVA 181, 187-88; Cheburakhin, Praktika primeneniia zakono-
datel'stva SSSR o grazhdanskoi pravosposobnosti inostrantsev (Judicial Practice in
the Application of Russian Legislation on Civil Law Capacity of Foreigners), Sovetskoe
Gosudarstvo i Pravo (Soviet State and Law) No. 8, pp. 114-17 (1957); Korobov &
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but rather citizens of territories annexed to the Soviet Union dur-
ing the course of World War II who leave property to relatives
who escaped to the West. The authority of these cases is thus ques-
tionable, and the factual setting in which they occur will soon disap-
pear. Nevertheless, the spirit of the Principles, which clearly at-
tempt to make certain concessions to alien beneficiaries, 5 could
indicate that United States citizens will be able to share in estates
of Soviet citizens as well as of aliens in the Soviet Union.5°
III
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
If either Professor Berman or Professor Ginsburgs were writing
this article, it might very well stop at this point. But a compre-
hensive analysis of the problem should include some further and
important considerations.
Sokolov, Imushchestvennye Prava inostrantsev v praktilce sovetskogo suda i notariata
(Property Rights of Aliens in the Practice of Soviet Courts and Notaries), [1961]
SOVETSKIi EZHEGODNIK MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA 361.
r Other aspects of the structure of the Principles may be briefly discussed. The
key term in article 127 is "permanent residence (postoiannoe mestozhitel'stvo)," which
provides the link between the matrix of legal relationships arising from the opening
of an estate, and the legal system to be applied to those relationships. To determine
residence, a Soviet court must look to Soviet law. According to Soviet writers, how-
ever, it is difficult in a concrete case for Soviet law to make such a determination.
See LUNTS, op. cit. supra note 53, at 283; Boguslavskii & Rubanov, supra note 54,
at 187.
Article 127 also applies the law of the permanent residence to all questions of
testamentary capacity and formal requirements of wills.
In the case of immovables, article 127 provides that Soviet law will govern in all
situations.
It is important to realize that article 127 applies only to situations involving the
general law of inheritance; if foreign law is found to be applicable, it replaces only
this general Soviet law. Two special situations are unaffected: where a kolkhoz member
dies, his share of its goods is not inheritable; and where a decedent has a savings
account, his instructions regarding disposal thereof must be followed.
See generally GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 134-40 (Law in
Eastern Europe No. 10, 1965).
5OAn interesting question of statutory interpretation may arise under a reciprocity
provision. Since most such statutes place the burden of showing reciprocity on the
foreign claimant (see note 21 supra), it is possible that such a claimant might be
successful in arguing that the Principles establish reciprocity in the case of tile alien
decedent, but be unsuccessful in arguing reciprocity where a citizen decedent is in-
volved. Would an American court then allow distribution to a foreign claimant
only where the decedent was an alien in this country and not where he was a citizen?
Or must the existence of reciprocity be determined as a whole? If the latter, would the
lack of reciprocity in any one situation vitiate the existence of reciprocity in all situa-
tions? Cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 118 (1895).
This decision may also become important when certain types of property are
involved. For example, as pointed out in note 55 supra, a decedent's share of kolkhoz
property is uninheritable. If an American decedent's property is in some form of joint
ownership, should an analogy be drawn and distribution refused?
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First, it must be remembered that to a large degree this is a one-
way street. The incidence of cases involving American estates
going, or attempting to go, to the communist parts of the world is
fairly high. In contrast, cases of estates located in the Soviet Union
devolving on foreign nationals abroad are comparatively rare, and
their size is rather unimportant. To the purist, this factor may
be of no consequence. Nevertheless, since private international law
always affects international commerce, it is difficult to cast blame
on American judges if this consideration carries some weight in
their decisions.
Second, international commerce involving rights of individuals
depends on reciprocity and equal treatment of nationals of various
countries by courts and government authorities in their mutual
relations. This is an old principle, and in international relations
represents one of the most important levers of cooperation between
nations. In a sense, reciprocity, tested either in its narrower or in
its broader conception, is the very essence of legal honesty; it is an
ideal in human relations under the rule of law, since it implies
equality of rights and of treatment. While it may be expedient
to depart from the principle of reciprocity-and international life
is full of such measures (e.g., guaranteed prices for products from
underdeveloped countries)-departure should be made only in
exceptional circumstances. It is fundamental, then, that reciprocity
in this broader sense is a permissible criterion for judicial determina-
tions in this area, whether under a benefit statute or reciprocity
statute or no statute.
Third, the present line of American judicial decisions represents
a part of the reaction of the free societies to the phenomenon of the
totalitarian state, with its aggressive social, economic and interna-
tional policies; it is a reflection of the impact of the totalitarian
state upon the position of the individual within its social and
economic fabric. Viewed with this in mind, it can be seen that the
reaction of the state legislatures and state courts dealing with in-
heritance rights of nationals of totalitarian states, whether subsumed
under the reciprocity or benefit formulas, is organically linked
with the condition of the citizen of the communist country at home.
The central idea of the long line of decisions of American courts,
however unsophisticated the language in which it is expressed,
is that inheritance rights of foreign nationals in communist coun-
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tries shall be respected only if their legal position in their home
country is broadly similar to that of an individual where the estate
lies. Otherwise their rights to property in this country are in fact
the rights of the foreign government. 57
All those who are involved in considerations of legal prob-
lems touching upon life in a socialist country must be aware of the
fact that individual rights represent not only a limited, but also a
changing concept. While from time to time socialist countries of
the Soviet type experience periods of liberalizing tendencies, they are
counterbalanced by periods of reaction and further restriction of
individual liberties. Individual life in those countries is shaped
by a vast program of social and economic reconstruction, financed
at the expense of the standard of living of the broad masses. In-
deed, the very concept of private property rights of the Soviet
citizen in his country is so drastically restricted that it is hardly
comparable to the situation of the individual member of a free
society. It must be stressed again that the right to inherit is in
the traditional sense a right to benefit the individual himself, not a
government or state.
IV
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Let us return briefly to an examination of Soviet law, this time
paying more careful attention to broader matters of policy.
In the Soviet Union, and in other communist countries, there
is considerable awareness of the real causes of American judicial
reluctance to give effect to the claims of communist citizens to shares
in American estates. Some socialist countries, such as Poland and
Yugoslavia, have taken steps to assure fuller use of American
legacies by their inheritors, which in turn has brought about reversal
of the attitude of American courts.58
But has the Soviet Union taken such steps? We know that from
the broad point of view, the Principles of Civil Legislation of 1961
represent a conscious effort by the Soviet government to abandon
the policy of insulation of Soviet life from contacts with the out-
57 Cf. Cakste, Das Pers6nliche Eigentum der Sowietburger (The Personal Property
of the Soviet Citizen), I OsTEuRoPA REczrr (East Europe Law) 27 (1955).
58E.g., In the Matter of Tybus, 28 Misc. 2d 278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Surr. Ct. 1961);
see In the Matter of Estate of Spehar, 140 Mont. 76, 367 P.2d 563 (1961); Poplawski
Estate, 10 Fiduc. Rep. 503 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1960); Aras Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 635
(Orphans' Ct. 1959).
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side world. The prior position was detrimental to national interests
since, among other things, Soviet citizens were unable to participate
in the distribution of foreign estates. As a first step toward the new
position the Soviet Union had signed a number of treaties with its
eastern satellites which established a uniform method of handling
foreign estates.50 Similar agreements, though less ambitious in
scope, had been concluded with other European countries.00 The
new policy was also emphasized in Soviet legal periodicals, obviously
to familiarize the West with the changing concept of Soviet inheri-
tance legislation0 1 The Principles of Civil Legislation are the
latest step in this "metamorphosis."
This does not answer our question, however. On the positive
side, we know also that in the Soviet Union it seemed for a while
that the death of Stalin, and the consequent liberalization of the
regime, would result in greater respect for individual rights, in-
cluding the upgrading of the private property institution. Soviet
legal periodicals carried a number of articles, written by leading
Soviet jurists, which pointed out that respect for individual rights
constitutes one of the cornerstones of socialist legality. 2 Hopes
of these jurists were substantiated by the program of vigorous reform
of the Soviet legal system. The Principles of Civil Legislation repre-
sent a comprehensive attempt to give meaning to the concept of
fundamental individual rights.
But there is also a negative side. As the reform of the legal
system and of the governmental techniques progressed, the Twenty-
First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1959
determined to redefine the meaning and to reorient the direction
of the legal reform in the Soviet Union.6 3 The Party thought that
"The Soviet Union has legal aid agreements with the following socialist coun-
tries: Bulgaria (19 S.D.D. USSR 230); Czechoslovakia (19 S.D.D. USSR 384); East
Germany (19 S.D.D. USSR 266); Hungary ([1958] Ved. SSSR No. 35); North Korea
(19 S.D.D. USSR 294); Poland (20 S.D.D. USSR 329); and Rumania (19 S.D.D. USSR
358).
G0The agreement with Greece referred to in note 58 supra is the only clear ex-
ample. A legal aid agreement with France made in 1936 is still in effect. 9 S.D.D.
USSR 85. Consular conventions were concluded with West Germany in 1958 ([19592
Ved. SSSR No. 17/101) and with Austria in 1959 ([1960] Ved. SSSR No. 215).
G'See articles cited note 54 supra; Volchkov & Rubanov, supra note 53.
2 E.g., Romashkin, Razvitie funktsii sovetskogo gosudarstva v protsesse postroienia
kommunizma (Development and Function of the Soviet Government in the Process
of Construction of Communism) Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo No. 10, p. 9 (1958).
3XXI sjezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo coiuza o razvitii i ukrepIenii
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the time was ripe to link the issue of reform with the question of
the transition of the Soviet state from socialism to communism.
The socialist state which followed the destruction of the capitalist
order, said the Congress, retained certain characteristics of the
bourgeois state, which were indispensable under socialism. Among
these were remnants of the bourgeois law, including techniques
of legal action and the use of force by the state. One of the aims
of the reform was to assure a higher degree of equality for all
members of the Soviet polity, in particular in the field of property
relations. As a commentator explained:
The building of communism, transforming all aspects of social
and personal life on a higher social basis, also introduces sub-
stantial changes in the problem of personal property. The estab-
lishment of communism is the objective basis for the intensifica-
tion of tendencies toward complete equality on the basis of ma-
terial and spiritual wealth.64
Socialism, as the first condition of human equality, was claimed
by Soviet scholars to be achieved by monopolizing the means of
production (socialist property) in the hands of the Soviet state.
This left considerable inequality in the category of consumer
goods (personal property), because the state of the national economy
was such that equal satisfaction of everyone's needs was impossible.
Communism, it is argued, will eventually remove this last aspect
of inequality by increasing the ability of special institutions to meet
individual needs beyond bare existence. This increasing ability
of social production to satisfy the needs of society will eventually
result in fundamental revision of the concept of property.
To reach this new dimension of equality, a new attitude and a
new legal basis regarding the use of the so-called durable consumer
goods must be created. Under socialism, those who contributed
more to social life earned higher incomes, and hence were able to
acquire legally a greater share of durable consumer goods-private
homes, cars, pleasure boats, and so forth-than the rest of society.
This attitude and legal form, expressed in the concept of personal
ownership, was proper so long as these goods were in short supply.
Now that production of them is assuming mass proportions, how-
sovetskogo sotsialisticheskogo gosudarsta (Twenty-First Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union on the Development and Strengthening of the Soviet Socialist
State) (1959).
e Stepanyan, Kommunizm i sobstvennost (Communism and Property), Oktiabr
(October) No. 9, p. 16 (1960).
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ever, personal ownership is no longer the correct solution. Rather,
the ideal situation is to establish a system where the use of these
goods is made available to the public without becoming the personal
property of the individuals.6 5
At the present moment, economic conditions in the Soviet Union
and the prosperity of the Soviet society are such that there is little
immediate danger that these views will result in the transformation
of the institutions of property into this higher degree of equality.
Nevertheless, Soviet government and party leadership have already
begun to experiment with the institution of personal property,
thus meriting inquiry into the question of the equality of property
relations between the Soviet citizen and the member of a free
society.
A New Development
The most graphic examples for our purposes of a possibly
emerging Soviet attitude toward personal property are two recent
decrees concerned with the uncompensated confiscation of certain
types of property. These decrees are in direct conflict with the
Principles of Civil Legislation of 1961. Article 31 of the Principles
states that:
The seizure of an owner's property in the interests of the State
or public, accompanied by payment to him of its value (requisi-
tion), and the seizure without compensation of property by the
State as a form of sanction for breach of the law (confiscation) are
permitted only in the instance and following the procedure set
out in the legislation of the USSR and Union Republics.66
Nevertheless, on July 26, 1962, a decree of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet provided for the uncompensated expropriation of
houses, cottages, and other structures built or acquired by citizens
with unearned income, or as a result of illegal use of means of
government enterprises, establishments, collective farms, and other
cooperative and social organizations. 7 Such structures were to be
transferred to the ownership of the communal housing fund of the
local authorities, to the kolkhozes and other cooperative and social
institutions. A similar decree passed in September of 1963 by the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, the largest Soviet
a' See GPzYBOvWsKr, SOVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 264-66 (1962).
0 Principles of Civil Legislation art. 31, [1961] Ved. SSSR No. 525.
07 [1962] Ved. SSSR No. 16.
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republic, provided that in proceedings for the expropriation of
structures acquired with unearned income, a court may also com-
mand confiscation of automobiles acquired in a similar manner.08
The two decrees were introduced in other Soviet republics and
vigorously enforced. 9 These enforcement cases indicate that a
substantive change is taking place with respect to the concepts of
ownership and personal property rights, linking them directly to
socially useful employment and the earnings directly connected
therewith. According to the opinion of a Soviet jurist:
The problem arises as regards the feasibility of the expropria-
tion of houses . . . acquired or constructed on unearned income
from the citizens who have become their owners as heirs, by con-
tract of gift, sale and purchase and by other methods. As the
statute does not recognize the right of ownership of structures in
persons, who have acquired them with unearned income, it must
be recognized that those persons, who have acquired these struc-
tures as inheritance or gift, may also be deprived of the right of
property in those structures. 0
A full examination of this development is obviously outside the
scope of the present article, and a full analysis of this downward
trend in property relations in the Soviet Union is available to the
American reader elsewhere.71 For present purposes it is enough to
point out the obvious fact that the two decrees have established a
new form of expropriation proceedings, in addition to expropriation
for public needs and confiscation incidental to criminal conviction.
The most important immediate consequence of the two decrees is
its revolutionary alteration of the property regime in the Soviet
Union, in conflict with the system of private rights established by
the new civil law and the public order of the Soviet Union guaran-
teed by the provision of the current constitution.7 2 This in turn has
importance for us in two respects.
8 See Sovetskaia Iustitsiia (Soviet Justice) No. 17, p. 7 (1963).
"' See Bloembergen, Personal Property: Downward Trends, Problems of Com-
munism, March-April 1965, p. 42, at 45-46.
7 Mironov, Voprosy primienienia zakona o bezvosmestnom izniatii stroienii
priobretennikh na netrudooye dokhody (The Problem of Application of the Law on
Uncompensated Confiscation of Structures Acquired on Unearned Income), Sovetskaia
Iustitsiia No. 24, p. 6 (1962). (Emphasis added.) Cf. Mironov, Iz praktihi bezvostmiest-
nogo izniatia stroienii vozvedennikh ili priobretennikh grazhdanami na netrudovye
dokhody (Concerning the Practice of Uncompensated Confiscation of Structures Built
or Acquired by Citizens on Unearned Income), Sovetskaia Iustitsiia No. 7, pp. 6-8 (1964).
"1'E.g., Bloembergen, supra note 69.
72 U.S.S.R. CONSr. 1936, art. 10.
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In the first place, the two decrees point to the fluidity of property
relations in the Soviet Union. Contrary to what Professors Berman
and Ginsburgs would want us to believe, private property rights
in the Soviet Union are not stable institutions, and this affects
vitally the scope and function of the institution of inheritance
rights of Soviet nationals and foreigners alike.
In the second place, the old problem of the purpose of recogni-
tion of inheritance rights in a foreign country is raised again in a
new context. It may be contrary to the public policy of a free
society to distribute shares from estates lying in their territory to
foreign citizens who have no right to property acquired on unearned
income. While the two decrees presently in force apply only to
houses and automobiles, it is reasonable to assume that further
extensions will occur; and even under the present decrees, the re-
moval of these two items from the permissible uses to which funds
transmitted to communist citizens can be put raises serious doubts
as to the existence of equality of property rights.
In the broadest perspective, then, contrary again to what the
American legal profession is being told, the issue is not so much the
improper attitude of American courts and judges who are inclined
to rely on opinions of ill-informed experts; quite apart from the
legal ability of the two competing expert witnesses in the Goga-
bashvele case,73 the basic issue concerns the fact that social policy
affects property relations in the Soviet Union. In this respect, the
Soviet regime seems unwilling for reasons of its own internal policy
to adopt a position which would inspire confidence in its foreign
partners in international legal commerce. Professor Lunts, the
foremost Soviet authority in the field of conflicts, has admitted that
international legal commerce of the Soviet Union with other
countries as expressed in the institution of private international
law enacted in Soviet statutes or agreed to in international agree-
ments with other countries, is determined by its attitude to prob-
lems of international cooperation. 4
In other words, the Soviet government feels no compelling reason
to stabilize its property relations to meet the requirements of the
benefit or reciprocity legislation of the American states.
'3 195 Cal. App. 2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Professor Berman
and Dr. Gsovski were the primary expert witnesses for the two competing parties in
this case.
7" 1 LUNTS, op. cit. supra note 53, at 3.
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CONCLUSION
In final analysis, the present unhappy situation with regard to
claims of Soviet citizens to American estates cannot be wholly at-
tributed to the prejudice and political bias of American courts and
judges. Where confronted with the clear legal issue of reciprocity
in the form of an international treaty, for example, American courts
now generally recognize their duty to honor the public policy of
the United States government.75 Likewise, American courts have
decided that where a communist government makes arrangements
which as nearly as possible give its nationals the benefit of their
shares in American estates, distribution to them should be allowed. 0
In the case of the Soviet Union, however, so long as its government
follows a policy which is contrary to the clear public policy of this
country, an American court may be justified in refusing to distribute
funds from American estates to its citizens, under either a benefit
or reciprocity statute.
75E.g., In the Matter of Estate of Spehar, 140 Mont. 76, 367 P.2d 563 (1961); In
the Matter of Estate of Kasendorf, 222 Ore. 463, 353 P.2d 531 (1960). While some
state courts still will not honor treaties, it is now probable that such decisions will be
reversed by the Supreme Court. E.g., Belemecich Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 511, 192 A.2d 740,
743 (1963), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Consul Gen. of Yugoslavia v. Pennsylvania,
375 U.S. 395 (1964); Estate of Stoich, 220 Ore. 448, 349 P.2d 255 (1960), rev'd sub nora.
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961). Contra, Estate of Eng, 228 Cal. App. 2d 160,
39 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965).
76E.g., In the Matter of Tybus, 28 Misc. 2d 278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Surr. Ct. 1961);
see In the Matter of Estate of Spehar, 140 Mont. 76, 367 P.2d 563 (1961); Poplawski
Estate, 10 Fiduc. Rep. 503 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1960); Aras Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 635
(Orphans' Ct. 1959).
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